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SUMMARY
Contrary to common perceptions, today both property and violent crimes (with 
the exception of homicides) are more widespread in Europe than in the United 
States, while the opposite was true thirty years ago. We label this fact as the 
‘reversal of misfortunes’. We investigate what accounts for the reversal by 
studying the causal impact of demographic changes, incarceration, abortion, 
unemployment and immigration on crime. For this we use time series data 
(1970–2008) from seven European countries and the United States. We ﬁnd 
that the demographic structure of the population and the incarceration rate are 
important determinants of crime. Our results suggest that a tougher 
incarceration policy may be an effective way to contrast crime in Europe. Our 
analysis does not provide information on how incarceration policy should be 
made tougher nor does it provide an answer to the question whether such a 
policy would also be efﬁcient from a cost-beneﬁt point of view. We leave this 
to future research.
- Paolo Buonanno, Francesco Drago, Roberto Galbiati and Giulio Zanella
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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the interest of policymakers in crime and the long tradition of economic
analysis of delinquent behaviour, there is a surprising lack of quantitative research
on the determinants of crime and on the effects of crime control policies outside
the United States, particularly in Europe. Much of what we know is based on anal-
yses of American data,1 and is summarized by Levitt (2004) and Levitt and Miles
(2007).2 The primary goal of this paper is to fill this gap: we employ data on crime
in Europe as well, and perform a cross-country empirical investigation of crime
trends during the last 40 years. Here and in what follows, by Europe we mean
Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
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1 An exception is Cook and Khmilevska (2005), who compare crime rates across countries.
2 Other important contributions in criminology and economics to the understanding of crime trends in the US include Blum-
stein and Wallman (2000), Cook and Laub (2002), and Zimring (2006).
Although this choice is primarily driven by data availability, these seven countries
account for more than 80% of the pre-2004 population of the current European
Union, with an aggregate population above 300 million – a figure comparable to
the US population.
It is well known that the United States experienced an unexpected drop in
crime rates after 1990. In Europe, on the contrary, crime rates have been on the
rise since at least 1970. Contrary to common perceptions, crime is today more
widespread in Europe than in the United States, while the opposite was true 30
years ago. This fact, which we label the ‘reversal of misfortunes’, is documented in
Figures 1–3. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the total crime rate (crimes of any
kind reported to the police per 1,000 inhabitants) in the United States and in
Europe. In 1970 the aggregate crime rate in the seven European countries we con-
sider was 63% of the corresponding US figure, but by 2007 it was 85% higher
than in the United States. This striking reversal results from a steady increase in
the total crime rate in Europe during the last 40 years, and the decline in the US
rate after 1990. The reversal of misfortunes is also observed for property and
violent crimes. Figure 2 documents the trends in the property crime rate. Although
in this case Europe and the United States have been moving along a common
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Figure 1. Total crime in the United States and in Europe
trend since the early 1990s, the European rate in 2007 was still 20% above the
US rate, while in 1970 the Europe/US ratio was below 30%. The same pattern is
found when looking at individual countries, with the exceptions of France and
Italy. Figure 3 shows the reversal for violent crimes: in 1970 the violent crime rate
in Europe was 62% of the corresponding rate in the United States. By 2008 it was
more than twice the US figure. We discuss later how varying reporting rates may
alter these patterns.
These pictures reveal a substantial divergence between crime trends in Europe
and the United States. Apparently, the American experience is a story of success in
crime control when compared to what happened on the other side of the Atlantic.
This makes a cross-country investigation of the determinants of crime rates an
interesting research question: although the United States and Europe have different
social and economic structures, it is natural to ask whether the different dynamics
of the crime rates in the two areas can be explained by the different dynamics of
the factors emphasized by the economics of crime.
We address this question by using a subset of such explanatory variables, for
which we have been able to collect long-term cross-country series: demographic
(b)
(a)
Figure 2. Property crimes in the United States and in Europe
changes, incarceration rates, abortion, unemployment and immigration. The chan-
nels through which these variables may affect crime are well known. The demo-
graphic structure of the population is important because different demographic
groups have different propensities to engage in crime. Young males, for instance,
are disproportionately more prone to crime than women or seniors. Incarceration
may have both a deterrent effect (the threat of being locked up reduces the net
expected benefit of crime) and an incapacitation effect (those who are imprisoned
cannot commit crimes). Past abortions, as Donohue and Levitt (2001) argue, may
have removed from society individuals who, because of the socioeconomic condi-
tions of their families, would have had a higher propensity for crime had they
reached adulthood. As for the unemployed, they have a lower opportunity cost of
engaging in crime due to their lack of legal sources of labour income. Finally,
immigrants are characterized by both socioeconomic traits and living and working
conditions that make them statistically more likely to commit crimes: they are
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Figure 3. Violent crimes in the United States and in Europe
Note: The jump in the UK violent crime rate after 1997 reflects a discontinuity in definitions and recording
practices. The Home Office (2008) notices that ‘the number of violence against the person offences recorded
by the police increased by 118 per cent as a result of the 1998 changes [...]. Much of this increase resulted
from a widening of the offence coverage to include assaults with little or no physical injury, and offences of
harassment (again with no injury)’ (p. 60). In the inferential part of the paper this will be controlled for by
year fixed effects. The dynamics after the discontinuity, though is genuine.
typically young, poorly educated, low income, and male, relative to their counter-
parts in the host country.
However, identifying the causal effect of these variables is challenging. First,
these variables and crime rates may share common unobserved trends. Second,
even if one treats the demographic structure of the population and the legalization
of abortion as exogenous with respect to crime, the remaining variables (incarcera-
tion, unemployment and immigration) are all potentially endogenous. In view of
these identification problems we opt for a conservative identification strategy. First,
in addition to the inclusion of country fixed effects and common year dummies, we
allow for flexible deterministic country-specific time trends. These help to remove
spurious correlations induced by unobserved common time effects, although they
may remove genuine correlations as well – this is why we call this approach conser-
vative. We will conduct sensitivity analysis on the choice of such trends. Second,
for the three aforementioned endogenous variables we employ a set of instrumental
variables that are widely accepted in the literature. To identify the effect of incar-
ceration rates on crime rates we exploit amnesties and collective pardons. Collective
clemencies are quite common in Europe (particularly in France and Italy) and lead
to a significant release of inmates during certain years for reasons that are mostly
political and so are arguably unrelated to crime rates (Barbarino and Mastrobuoni,
2008; Drago et al., 2009). For unemployment, we exploit the interaction between
the price of oil and the share of manufacturing in GDP to construct a country-
specific shifter of labour demand (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Raphael and Winter-
Ebmer, 2001; Lin, 2008). Finally, for immigration we resort to exogenous
supply-push components of migration by nationality as an instrument for the immi-
grant population in Europe and in the United States (Card, 1990; Angrist and
Kugler, 2003; Munshi, 2003; Saiz, 2007).
Despite the limitations deriving from these identifying assumptions and from the
additional implicit assumptions about the microstructure underlying our aggregate
regressions (discussed in the concluding section), our cross-country analysis is able
to shed some light on the different crime trends in Europe and in the United
States. The original contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we document the
‘reversal of misfortunes’, a surprising fact that contrasts with the stereotype of a safe
Europe relative to an unsafe America. The literature on crime in Europe typically
focuses on a single country and particular case studies (e.g. Bianchi et al., 2011;
Drago et al., 2009; Drago and Galbiati, 2010; Buonanno et al., 2009; and Draca
et al., 2010), but we are unaware of any cross-country studies of the determinants of
recent crime trends in Europe, nor of US-Europe comparisons. Second, we confirm
in a cross-country setting previous findings about the effects of incarceration and
demographic changes on crime, while we find no evidence in favour of the abortion
channel. Using our estimated elasticity of crime rates to prison population (about
)0.4) we quantify at 17% the causal contribution of different incarceration policies
in Europe and in the United States to the overall reversal. When looking at prop-
erty or violent crimes, this figure becomes 33% and 11%, respectively. As we dis-
cuss in more detail below, our estimates are policy relevant and point to potentially
important directions for research and policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and
discusses the five explanatory variables we use in the analysis. Section 3 illustrates
the identification strategy. Results are reported and discussed in Section 4. Section 5
concludes. The paper is complemented by a rich Web Appendix that contains addi-
tional data analyses that could not be included here due to space limitations. The
Web Appendix is available on line at https://sites.google.com/site/crimeeuropeusre
versal/. All data are posted at this journal’s website, as well as at the authors’
research pages.
2. DATA
2.1. Measuring crime
We collected data on crime and the explanatory variables of interest for seven
European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom) and the United States from 1970 to 2008. Our main measure
of criminal activity is the total number of offences reported to the police per 1,000
inhabitants. All explanatory variables are also normalized by the size of the popula-
tion. In addition to focusing on total crime, we distinguish between property and
violent crime when possible, and also look (in the Web Appendix) at homicides sep-
arately.3 The classification of property and violent crimes may vary across coun-
tries, because of different criminal codes: an act that is a property crime in country
A may be classified as a violent crime in country B. For instance, in Italy the police
record robbery as a property crime while in many other European countries and in
the United States robbery is classified as a violent crime. As a consequence, if one
wants to work with a homogeneous measure of crime rates across these different
countries, then the total number of crimes (of any kind) recorded by the police is
what should be used: this measure of crime minimizes measurement error in a
cross-country setting. We will nonetheless, in addition, report results for both prop-
erty and violent crime separately. Another issue is that reporting rates differ across
countries and vary in time in a non-uniform way, as is suggested by comparing
data from surveys of victims and from reports to the police (see, for instance,
Soares, 2004 and VanDijk et al., 2007). One may wonder whether different and
varying reporting rates bias the picture we want to render. This is not a concern
3 We classify property and violent crimes based on the definitions of the national police or the national statistical office. Typ-
ically, ‘property crime’ includes: any kind of theft, larceny, breaking in, burglary and fraud. ‘Violent crime’ includes: homi-
cide, serious or aggravated assault, robbery and sexual offences. An aggregate property crime measure is not available for
Austria, while it is available only after 1989 for Spain and after 1986 for Germany. Moreover, we were unable to find violent
crime data for Austria and Spain over the entire 1970–2008 period.
when doing inference (employing country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and coun-
try-specific trends absorbs the resulting variation), but a bias could be present when
looking at plain sample statistics.
The Web Appendix expands on these measurement issues. First, we take a sepa-
rate look at voluntary homicides, which have the same definition everywhere and
whose reporting rate is virtually 100% (very few voluntary homicides are not known
to the police or misclassified as, for instance, suicides). Second, we correct crime
rates using reporting rates from victimization surveys when possible. In both cases
we produce evidence consistent with the reversal of misfortunes: this does not seem
an artefact of measurement errors.
2.2. Crime in Europe and in the United States: stylized facts
Figures 1–3 reveal four important facts:
• Crime rates in Europe tend to move in parallel;
• Crime rates in Europe increased sharply from 1970 to 1990; the total crime rate
stabilized afterwards, with property crimes decreasing since the early 2000s and
violent crimes increasing steadily (with a few exceptions);
• Crime rates in the United States increased from 1970 to 1980, have no obvious
trend in the 1980s and decline sharply in the 1990s. The rate of decline is less
sharp from 2000 onward;
• Crime rates in the United States were above the corresponding rates in Europe
in 1970, but they have been below European levels in recent years (with a few
exceptions for property crime).
The decline in the US crime rates that began in the 1990s is discussed extensively
in the literature. Given the trend in the 1970s and 1980s, this decline was a sur-
prise and puzzled many analysts. According to Levitt (2004), increased incarcera-
tion, more police, the decline of crack and the legalization of abortion played an
important role in this process. Imrohoroglu et al. (2004) offer additional explana-
tions for the decline in property crimes: a higher probability of apprehension, the
stronger economy, and a change in the demographic structure – most notably a
decline in the demographic weight of young men. The further decline during the
last ten years is consistent with these findings. First, the number of police officers in
the United States has grown further since the early 2000s. Second, in the United
States a substantial fraction of the criminally active population at the end of the
1990s was born prior to the legalization of abortion. The fact that cohorts born
after the legalization of abortion reach adulthood is consistent with the decreasing
trend if the Donohue and Levitt (2001) explanation is correct. Third, the demo-
graphic weight of young Americans has further declined. Fourth, consistently with
the slowdown in the US crime trend during the 2000s, crack-related crimes and
prison population apparently reached a steady state after the end of the 1990s.
2.3. Five factors that may explain crime trends
As discussed in Section 1, the economics of crime suggests taking into account at
least two groups of variables that can explain crime rates. The first group includes
factors that directly influence the possibility of committing a crime and its opportu-
nity cost: police numbers, incarceration and unemployment. In particular, police
numbers and the prison population affect deterrence and incapacitation, and are
under the direct control of policymakers. Unfortunately, we are unable to include
police numbers in our analysis for two reasons. First, there is a lack of reliable
annual data on police forces in Europe before the mid-1990s. Second, we lack a
credible instrumental variable for which adequate data can be put together. The
second group includes sociodemographic variables, namely the age structure of
the population, and the abortion and immigration rates. The explanatory vari-
ables we use are the following: the share of males aged 15–34, the stock of
immigrants relative to the population, the abortion rate (defined as the propor-
tion of unborn children who would have been at least 18 years old in a given
year over the total population), the unemployment rate and the incarceration
rate. In the remainder of this section we discuss in detail what is known about
the relation between these variables and crime, and we document their dynamics
in our sample.
2.3.1. Demographics. It is well known in criminology that young males are statisti-
cally more likely to be offenders than any other demographic group. Levitt and
Lochner (2001) note that 18-year-old individuals are five times more likely to be
arrested for a property crime in the United States than their 35-year-old counter-
parts. For violent crime this ratio is 2:1. The same authors document that in 1997
those between 15 and 19 years old constituted 7% of the population but accounted
for over 20% of arrests for violent offences. In the light of these facts, the profound
demographic change caused in the United States by the ageing of the baby boom-
ers has been considered a potentially important driver in the decline in crime rates
in the United States during the 1990s. Levitt (2004) notes that people over 65 have
per-capita arrest rates approximately 2% the level of 15- to 19-year-olds, but claims
that the change in the age structure of the population played little role in explain-
ing the drop in crime. Imrohoroglu et al. (2004) observe that the share of the popu-
lation between 15 and 25 years old declined from 20.5% to 15.1% in the same
period, and claim that this accounts for 11% of the total drop in property crime
(the rate per 100 inhabitants in the United States dropped from 5.60 in 1980 to
4.65 in 1996). As for Europe, it is well known that in the period 1970–2008 most
countries first experienced an increase in the proportion of young individuals
(1970-990) and then a generalized growth in the proportion of seniors, about
10 years after the proportion of seniors picked up in the United States. Figures 4a
and 4b illustrate the share of males between 15 and 34 in our sample.
2.3.2. Immigration. There are several reasons why immigrants and natives may
have different propensities to engage in crime. Part of this difference reflects the
migration process. Immigrants from less developed to more developed countries are
typically young, poorly educated and male. This makes them statistically more
likely to engage in crime. Thus, if we draw random samples of immigrants and
natives in a given country after conditioning on certain socioeconomic characteris-
tics, the two groups would probably have very similar criminal attitudes. In this
sense immigration may mechanically affect delinquency rates in receiving countries.
Furthermore, natives and immigrants may have a different opportunity cost of
crime. For instance, they may face different labour market prospects of working
legally, and they may face different probabilities of being convicted and different
costs of conviction, for instance because of the possibility of being deported.
Few empirical papers have investigated the relationship between immigration
and crime. Using individual data, Butcher and Piehl (1998b, 2005) find that current
immigrants in the United States have lower incarceration rates than natives, while
the pattern is reversed for the early 1900s (Moehling and Piehl, 2007). Using aggre-
gate data from US metropolitan areas in the 1980s, Butcher and Piehl (1998a)
conclude that the inflow of immigrants had no significant impact on crime rates.
Finally, Borjas et al. (2010) argue that recent immigrants have contributed to the
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Figure 4. Share of young males (15–34) in the United States and in Europe
criminal activity of native black males by displacing them from the labour market.
Evidence for European countries is even scarcer. Bianchi et al. (2011) examine the
empirical relationship between immigration and crime across Italian provinces dur-
ing the period 1990–2003. Drawing on police administrative records, they first
document that the size of the immigrant population is positively correlated with the
incidence of property crimes and with the overall crime rate. Then, using instru-
mental variables based on immigration toward destination countries other than
Italy, they find no evidence of a causal effect of immigration on crime in Italy.
Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics of immigration rates in Europe and the United
States. There are heterogeneous patterns in Europe. In particular, while Spain
and Italy have experienced a dramatic increase in immigration since the early
1990s, in the Netherlands and in Germany the proportion of immigrants grew
more modestly.
2.3.3. Abortion. According to Donohue and Levitt (2001), the legalization of abor-
tion in the United States following the Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision (410
US 113, 1973) had a causal impact on crime via the high number of abortions per-
formed in the United States just after the Supreme Court decision. The underlying
(and quite controversial) theory is that unwanted children are at greater risk of
committing crime. Therefore, the legalization of abortion ultimately reduced the
(a)
(b)
Figure 5. Immigration rates in the United States and Europe
birth of children who, had they been born, would have been at greater risk of com-
mitting crimes when they reached their teenage years. Levitt (2004) refers to various
studies supporting this hypothesis and showing that children born because their
mothers were denied abortion were substantially more likely to be involved in
crime, even when controlling for the income, age, education and health of the
mother. Further recent evidence supports this idea by showing that the legalization
of abortion reduced out-of-wedlock teen childbearing (Donohue et al., 2009). A
lively debate followed the article by Donohue and Levitt (2001),4 but the key find-
ings of the original article have so far proved robust. A discussion of the abortion
hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper but the extension of the analysis to our
panel of European countries is important to provide further evidence along this line
of research.
In Europe the legalization of abortion did not follow a uniform pattern. Some
countries in our dataset legalized abortion in the 1970s, as did the United States,
others later.5 To date, to the best of our knowledge, the only papers studying the
relationship between abortion and crime in European countries are Pop-Eleches
(2006) and Kahane et al. (2007), who focus on Romania and on England and
Wales, respectively. The evidence from these studies is mixed. Pop-Eleches (2006)
exploits abortion bans during the Ceausescu era in Romania as a source of identifi-
cation and finds results in line with Donohue and Levitt (2001), while Kahane et al.
(2007) employ panel data and show that Donohue and Levitt’s result does not hold
in England and Wales when one uses a different abortion index.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the relevance of abortions in the United States and
Europe. Figure 6 reports the number of abortions relative to (roughly) the number
of pregnancies. The abortion rate in the United States is always higher than in
Europe as an aggregate, except after the early 2000s. In the first decade after the
Roe v. Wade decision in the United States we observe a dramatic jump in the num-
ber of abortions leading to a ratio of abortions over the overall number of pregnan-
cies of about one-fourth. In Europe the initial increase is less dramatic due to the
staggered legalization in the continent. Figure 7 shows that the number of unborn
children that would have been adult in a given year starts growing in the 1990s
both in the United States and in Europe. In the empirical analysis we will construct
the share of aborted adults using an approach similar to that of Donohue and
Levitt (2001). The only important difference is that, due to data limitations, we can-
not weight abortion rates by the percentage of arrests in a cohort over the total
crime in a given country for a benchmark year.
4 See Foote and Goetz (2008), Joyce (2004) and Donohue and Levitt (2004 and 2008).
5 The UK legalized abortion in 1968, France and Austria in 1975, West Germany in 1976, Italy in 1978, the Netherlands in
1980 and Spain in 1985, but only for mental or physical danger within the 12th week. Abortion for other reasons was fully
legalized in Spain only in 2009.
2.3.4. Unemployment. According to the benchmark economic model of crime
(Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973), labour market opportunities may affect a rational
individual’s decision to engage in crime: if legal income opportunities are less lucra-
tive than the expected gains from crime, individuals will opt for the latter. There-
fore, unemployment may lead to an increase in crime through two channels. First,
the expected returns from legal work decrease if the probability of being unem-
ployed is higher. Second, given a downward sloping labour demand curve, more
unemployment is associated with a lower wage rate. These two effects contribute to
reducing the opportunity cost of crime. Hence, we can expect unemployment to
have a positive effect on the crime rate. Recent empirical studies employing panel
data at the state or regional level (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould et al.,
2002; Lin, 2008; Oster and Agell, 2007; Fougere et al., 2009) reach a consensus that
increasing unemployment contributes to an increase in property crimes (although
the magnitude is not large) and does not significantly affect violent crimes. Imro-
horoglu et al. (2004), on the contrary, conclude that the effect of unemployment on
crime is negligible. Figure 8 reports the dynamics of the unemployment rates for
the eight countries under investigation.
2.3.5. Incarceration. Of all the explanatory variables we are considering, the most
striking difference between Europe and the United States pertains to incarceration
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Figure 6. Abortion rates in the United States and Europe
rates. This fact is illustrated in Figure 9. Between 1970 and 2008 the prison popula-
tion per 1,000 inhabitants increased by a factor of more than 4.5 in the United
States and by a factor of 3 in Europe, but there is a dramatic difference in levels.
Back in 1970 the US/Europe ratio between incarceration rates was 4. Between
2007 and 2008 it was an astonishing 7. Although there are different patterns across
the seven European countries we are considering and although the dynamic is simi-
lar to the United States, nowhere in Europe are incarceration rates comparable to
(b)
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Figure 7. Aborted children who would have been adults in a given year
Figure 8. Unemployment rates in the United States and Europe
what we see in America. According to Levitt (2004), the prison population was one
of the main factors explaining the decline in crime rates in the United States during
the 1990s: this variable accounts for 12% of the reduction in homicides and violent
crimes from 1991 to 2001. The impact of the prison population on crime rates
should be interpreted as the sum of two effects: deterrence (a large prison popula-
tion implies a high probability of incarceration for potential criminals) and incapaci-
tation (people who are locked up cannot commit crimes). Although it is not
possible to distinguish between deterrence and incapacitation in a reduced-form
framework, the effect of the prison population is of interest because the severity of
punishment is a variable that can be manipulated by policymakers.
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In order to understand how the different factors reported above might have
affected crime rates and the ‘reversal of misfortunes’, we estimate the following
model:
lnðcrimeitÞ ¼ ai þ blnðxitÞ þ tdi þ kt þ eit
where crimeit is some measure of the crime rate (total, property, or violent) in coun-
try i at time t, ai is a country fixed effect, xit contains explanatory variables for
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Figure 9. Incarceration in the United States and in Europe
country i at time t (a constant, the share of males between 15 and 34 years old in
the population, the immigration rate, the share of potential adults aborted, the
unemployment rate, and the incarceration rate), t is a polynomial in time, di is a
country dummy (so that tdi is a country-specific deterministic trend), and kt is a
common year dummy. By taking logs of all variables we will be able to interpret
coefficients as elasticities with respect to the relevant rates.
Unlike unemployment, the immigration rate and incarceration, abortion rates
and the age structure of the population are determined at least 15 years earlier
than actual crime rates. We maintain the assumption that these two variables are
exogenous with respect to crime after including country-specific time trends and
year and country fixed effects. Abortion rates are computed as follows. We first cal-
culate the annual abortion rate as a proportion of unborn children who would have
been at least 18 years old in a given year over the total population. The impact of
the variation in abortion rates for a given cohort plausibly depends on the extent of
criminal behaviour within that cohort.
For this reason, Donohue and Levitt’s measure of the abortion rate is computed
as the sum of the abortion rate of each age group weighted by the percentage of
arrests in that cohort over the total crime in the United States for a benchmark
year. Unfortunately, crime data by cohort are not available for Europe. Therefore,
we use unweighted abortion rates. This produces a particular abortion rate (abortikt)
in country i for any age k, in the current year, t. It is important to understand that
this particular abortion rate measures the number of aborted children in the past
that would have been adult in year t. A causal effect is identified by the within
country variation in access to abortion.
All other variables are endogenous to crime rates and for each of them we adopt
an instrumental variable strategy, described in detail in the remainder of this section.
3.1. Immigration
Crime and immigration are likely to be simultaneously determined in equilibrium,
hence the identification problem. Following Card (2001), researchers have con-
structed outcome-based measures of supply-push factors using total migration
inflows by nationality toward the destination country of interest. Examples of this
approach are Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Cortes (2008), and Card (2009). The
idea is that new immigrants of a given nationality tend to settle in the same areas
as previous immigrants from the same country (e.g. Munshi, 2003; Jaeger, 2006;
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007). This approach, however, has some limitations. To
mention one, total inflows by nationality may be correlated with local demand-pull
factors, including those originating in the ‘crime market’. If all immigrants from a
given country moved to the same receiving country, it would be impossible to dis-
entangle push and pull factors based on total inflows by nationality. Bianchi et al.
(2011), in an application to Italy, solve this problem by using a measure of supply-
push factors based on bilateral migration inflows toward destination countries other
than Italy. We follow a similar route and resort to an exogenous supply-push com-
ponent of migration by nationality as an instrument for shifts in the immigrant pop-
ulation across European countries and the United States. Supply-push factors are
all the events in origin countries that increase the propensity to migrate, such as
civil wars, ethnic wars, ethnic violence, economic crises, political turmoil and natu-
ral disasters (Card, 1990; Angrist and Kruger, 2003; Munshi, 2003; Saiz, 2007). As
an exogenous measure of supply-push factors by origin country one would ideally
use data on all the origin countries by destination countries. This is virtually impos-
sible to do for all countries, but it can be done for a relevant subset of them. We
have built an original database containing information on civil wars, ethnic wars
and ethnic violence for 38 origin countries which are heavily represented in
European countries and in the United States. Specifically, we consider the top ten
sending countries for each European country and the United States. Since the top
ten sending countries tend to overlap, in particular for European countries, the final
number of origin countries considered is 38. The list of origin and destination
countries used to construct the instrument is reported in the Web Appendix.
Identification exploits an instrumental variable labelled IVWar. For each destina-
tion country, we restrict our sample to the period 1980 to 2008, since data on the
immigrant stock are not available for all countries in our sample before 1980.
Moreover, we exclude France because data on the stock of immigrants are available
only every 5 years. We define the top sending countries, and for each sending
country and year we build a dummy variable ‘War’ which assumes value 1 if a civil
war, ethnic war or ethnic violence took place in the sending country in that year,
and zero otherwise. For example, if a civil war, ethnic war or ethnic violence took
place in Kenya in the year 2000 the dummy ‘War’ will assume value 1 for every
receiving country that has Kenya as a top-10 sending country. We then generate
our instruments as follows:
IVWarit ¼ Rjðpopjt=popitÞWarijt
where i, j and t index respectively receiving country, sending countries and year,
while pop is country population. The crucial identifying assumption is that this mea-
sure of the supply-push component in origin countries is uncorrelated with unob-
servable determinants of crime rates in the receiving country. To the extent that
the events defining variable War are exogenous to receiving countries (as they argu-
ably are) this is not a concern.
3.2. Unemployment
Following Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Lin (2008) we employ a state-spe-
cific measure of oil price shocks as an exogenous shift for unemployment. The relation
between the unemployment rate and the price of oil has been discussed and analysed
by Blanchard and Katz (1992), among others. This approach allows us to isolate the
exogenous (with respect to crime) component of variations in unemployment in the
data and so to identify a causal effect of unemployment on crime. The instrument is
constructed as follows. For each country and each year, we define the proportion of
employment in the manufacturing sector. This allows us to roughly measure the rele-
vance of energy-intensive industries. Next, by using the world price of crude oil (spot
price, West Texas Intermediate), we construct a measure of state-specific exposure to
oil shocks by interacting the proportion of employment in manufacturing and the
price of oil. The idea behind this instrument is simple. Since there are no short-run
substitutes for energy in manufacturing and since the price of oil is presumably unaf-
fected by the economic activity of the eight countries in our panel, any variation in
the price of oil generates an exogenous variation in unemployment – manufacturers
must reduce their consumption of energy by reducing output and employment. The
identifying assumption is that such shocks do not affect crime directly.
3.3. Incarceration
The incarceration rate is endogenous because it may simply reflect the extent of
crime: the more people engage in crime the larger the prison population. Ideally,
one would like to exploit quasi-experiments that exogenously alter the imprison-
ment rate. This is what Levitt (1996), Drago et al. (2009) and Barbarino and
Mastrobuoni (2008) do for the United States and Italy, respectively. Levitt uses
prison overcrowding litigation: court decisions in the United States may limit the
growth rates of inmates in state prisons for reasons that have nothing to do with
the incidence of crime. This generates an exogenous source of variation in the
prison population relative to control states. Drago et al. (2009) use a collective par-
don implemented in Italy in 2006 to reduce the population in overcrowded prisons
to identify the deterrent effect of an increase in expected prison sentences.6 Barbari-
no and Mastrobuoni (2008) exploit a series of prison amnesties in Italy to estimate
the incapacitation effect of prison. These studies have the advantage of exploiting
credible sources of exogenous variation in the prison population or expected prison
sentences. However, they refer to single countries.
We follow this line of research and exploit amnesties across different countries
to construct an instrument for prison population. Specifically, we first consider
prison population lagged by one year – the number of inmates in prison statistics
refers to the stock at the end of a given year. Therefore, our aim is to identify the
effect of the prison population at time t–1 on crime rates at time t. The prison
6 The collective pardon bill commuted actual sentences into expected sentences for those with less than three years of resid-
ual sentence. Thus, by exploiting the plausible exogeneity of residual sentences, Drago et al. (2009) can provide an estimate of
the deterrent effect of prison sentences.
population at time t–1 in a given country is instrumented with a dummy that is
equal to one if in the same year (t–1) an amnesty was passed in that country. The
identifying assumption is that an amnesty affects crime rates only via the induced
variation in prison population. We believe this assumption is credible. Many of the
collective pardons and amnesties implemented by European countries between
1970 and 2008 were officially motivated by either political or humanitarian rea-
sons. In many cases this is unquestionably so, as with the three consecutive amnes-
ties approved in Spain after the end of the Franco dictatorship. However, one
might suspect that in some cases such official motivations mask attempts to quickly
reduce prison overcrowding. If this were the case, then amnesties would be pre-
dictable by looking at the past evolution of crime rates. Below we present evidence
that this is not the case. We first report in Table 1 the timing and description of
the amnesties used in our dataset. The official motivations seem to be unrelated to
crime rates. As supporting evidence of this exclusion restriction, we report in
Table 2 the results a regression of amnesties at time t on crime rates in earlier
years. A significant relationship between past crime rates and amnesties would cast
doubts on the validity of the identification strategy: it would suggest that amnesties
are determined by or correlated to past trends in criminal activity. Table 2, how-
ever, shows that crime rates in earlier years do not systematically predict amnes-
ties. This is also true when we include crime rates with three lags. Given that in
some countries amnesties have occasionally been passed every other year, it is reas-
suring that crime rates one year, and two and three years earlier together do not
predict amnesties.
As in all instrumental variable estimates, the elasticity of crime rates to prison
population should be interpreted as a local average treatment effect (LATE). This
raises the question of whether our results can be generalized to countries (such as
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States) where no amnesty
was passed during the 40 years on which we focus. An additional issue is that the
only logically possible effect of amnesties is a reduction in the prison population,
while the interpretation of the elasticity we estimate is two-sided (it includes a deter-
rence and an incapacitation effect). While these problems arise commonly when
employing instrumental variables, it is important to keep them in mind when
attempting out-of-sample policy exercises.
3.4. Country specific time trends
It is common in longitudinal analyses to include a time trend to account for the
possible exogenous dynamics of the dependent variable of interest. Without doing
so, such dynamics could be wrongly interpreted as caused by some explanatory var-
iable that moves along a trend correlated (because of other underlying forces) with
the trend of the dependent variable. In other words, a time trend removes possible
spurious correlations. This comes at a price, though: superimposing an exogenous
time trend may remove genuine correlation as well, that is, produce overfitting. We
prefer to take a conservative approach and pay this price. This is even more impor-
tant in a cross-country study, where trends may be country-specific. The question
remains of which trend is the appropriate one.
To estimate the causal effects of our independent variables, we include in the
basic specifications a country-specific deterministic quartic trend, that is, a polyno-
mial of degree four in time with country-specific coefficients. Such a specification
strikes a reasonable balance between the need for flexibility in time trends and
degrees of freedom. In particular, a quartic trend allows us to avoid bias in the
Table 1. Timing and description of collective clemencies
Country Year Description
Austria 1995 Collective pardon for the 50th anniversary of the restoration
of independence.
France 1980,1985 Collective graces, providing for a reduction of 15 days of the
remaining time to be spent in prison for each month of
original sentence.
1981,1988,1995 Presidential amnesties for the election or re-election of a
president.
Germany 1996, 1997 Pardons granted to prisoners after serving half of their
sentences for failure to pay a fine.
Italy 1970 Amnesty of five years for crimes concerning the illegal
holding of fire arms and violation of custom laws. Three
years amnesty for theft and property crimes. Two years
pardon for crimes covered by the military penal code.
1978 Two years pardon for theft, crimes related to public health
and sex crimes.
1981 Two years pardon for theft, crimes related to public health
and sex crimes. Three years’ amnesty for non-financial
crimes with the exclusion of recidivists and criminals
sentenced to more than 10 years.
1986 One-year pardon for theft, crimes related to public health
and sex crimes. Three years’ amnesty for non-financial
crimes with the exclusion of recidivists and criminals
sentenced to more than 10 years.
1990 Four years’ amnesty for crimes related to the illegal holding
of arms, crimes related to strikes, crimes committed by
criminals under age 18, crimes related to the tobacco
monopoly.
2003 Two years’ pardon for criminals who had already served at
least half of their original sentence with the exclusion of
recidivists and professional criminals.
2006 Three year pardon with the exclusion of crimes related to
the mafia, paedophilia and terrorism.
Spain 1975 First amnesty for political prisoners under Franco’s
dictatorship, on the occasion of the coronation of the King
of Spain.
1976 Second amnesty for political prisoners under Franco’s
dictatorship.
1977 Third amnesty for political prisoners under Franco’s
dictatorship.
estimation of crime growth at the beginning and at the end of the period under
investigation. This problem was discussed in the empirical labour literature by Mur-
phy and Welch (1990), who showed that a quartic trend outperforms quadratic and
cubic specifications when fitting life-cycle earnings profiles: quadratic and cubic
specifications generate substantial spurious growth or fall particularly at the begin-
ning and the end of a worker’s career. Figure 10 suggests that the same problem
arises, mutatis mutandis, in our panel. This figure shows, for each country we con-
sider, the residuals from a regression of the total crime rate on a polynomial func-
tion of time: first (solid), second (dots and dashes), third (dots), and fourth order
(dashes), respectively. Although a common choice elsewhere in the crime literature,
a linear trend would be a very poor choice for the case at hand as it performs quite
badly relative to non-linear (in time) specifications, not surprisingly. While quadratic
and cubic trends improve a lot over the linear specification, they are outperformed
by the quartic trend, most notably at the edges of the time interval we are consider-
ing. Country-specific quartic trends are illustrated in Figure 11. Although we do
not know exactly what a quartic deterministic trend removes in this case (which is
why we stress we are taking a conservative approach) the inclusion of country-
specific trends and common year dummies improves our estimates in two distinct
senses. First, only deviations of crime from such trends are left to be explained.
This raises the bar of the explanatory power required of the regressors. Second, it
Table 2. Effect of earlier crime rates on amnesties
1 2 3 4 5
Log total crime (t – 1) 0.05 0.24 0.40
(0.20) (0.28) (0.31)
Log total crime (t – 2) )0.18 )0.50
(0.26) (0.36)
Log total crime (t – 3) 0.50*
(0.27)
Log property crime (t – 1) 0.43
(0.40)
Log property crime (t – 2) )0.84
(0.52)
Log property crime (t – 3) 0.80**
(0.40)
Log violent crime (t – 1) )0.70*
(0.35)
Log violent crime (t – 2) 0.54
(0.39)
Log violent crime (t – 3) )0.16
(0.34)
F-stat on lagged crime rates 0.05 0.40 1.33 1.34 1.38
Obs. 282 274 266 213 182
Countries 8 8 8 7 6
Notes: All specifications include country fixed effects, year fixed effects and a quartic country specific time
trend. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%.
improves the precision of the estimates. A thorough analysis of time effects in our
sample (e.g. into whether the trend is in fact deterministic or stochastic, or the coin-
tegration relation between the variables we use) goes beyond the scope of the
paper.
Figure 10. Residuals from polynomial time trends, total crime
Figure 11. Quartic country-specific trends, total crime
In the Web Appendix we further discuss the issue of country-specific time trends.
In particular, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the inclusion of such trends or
not, and on the order of the polynomial in time when included. It turns out that,
in general, our main result is robust to including or not a country-specific trend,
and to the type of trend included (linear, quadratic, cubic, or quartic). The choice
of a quartic trend actually produces estimates at the lower end of the range for total
and property crimes.
4. RESULTS
Our results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. Results for total crime are reported in
Tables 3a and 4a, and results on property and violent crime are reported in
Tables 3b and 4b, and 3c and 4c, respectively. Odd and even columns report the
results for the full sample and for Europe only, respectively. To understand the bias
of the OLS relative to the IV estimates, Table 3 reports OLS estimates and Table
4 IV estimates.
4.1. OLS estimates
For the reasons discussed above, one cannot interpret the OLS coefficients as cau-
sal effects. However, it is informative to look at them. Tables 3a–3c show that,
when using OLS, incarceration has a negative and statistically significant impact on
crime across different specifications. This coefficient should be downward biased if
higher crime rates are associated with higher incarceration rates. These estimates
also show that the effect of age structure is positive and statistically significant,
Table 3a. OLS estimates, total crime
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ln(incarceration) )0.33*** )0.33*** )0.32*** )0.32*** )0.29*** )0.29*** )0.26*** )0.25***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
ln(abortion) 0.00 )0.00 0.00 )0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(males 15–34) 1.76** 1.79* 1.69** 1.68* 2.91*** 2.84** 2.86*** 2.92**
(0.79) (1.00) (0.79) (1.00) (1.03) (1.24) (1.00) (1.21)
ln(unemp. rate) 0.07* 0.06 0.12*** 0.14***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
ln(immigration) 0.28*** .029*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Sample Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe
Observations 239 203 239 203 189 161 189 161
Countries 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7
Notes: All specifications include country fixed effects, year fixed effects and a quartic country specific time
trend. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
whereas the coefficient on abortion is close to zero and imprecisely estimated.
Given that the age structure and abortion are predetermined variables, the only
bias on the estimated coefficients in these specifications derives from the inclusion
of other endogenous variables such as incarceration, unemployment and immigra-
tion. The coefficients on immigration are positive and precisely estimated only for
total crime (Table 3a), whereas the results on unemployment are somewhat mixed.
Unlike incarceration however, it is difficult to establish the sign of the possible bias
in the coefficients of unemployment and immigration.
Table 3b. OLS estimates, property crime
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ln(incarceration) )0.45*** )0.49*** )0.44*** )0.47*** )0.38*** )0.42*** )0.38*** )0.41***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
ln(abortion) 0.00 )0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 )0.00 0.00 )0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(males 15–34) 0.22 1.65 0.48 2.54 1.39 )0.08 1.93 0.83
(1.06) (1.69) (1.05) (1.71) (1.78) (2.27) (1.87) (2.47)
ln(unemp. rate) 0.08* 0.11** 0.05 0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
ln(immigration) 0.03 )0.05 0.05 )0.03
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Sample Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe
Observations 207 171 207 171 156 128 156 128
Countries 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6
Notes: All specifications include country fixed effects, year fixed effects and a quartic country specific time
trend. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
Table 3c. OLS estimates, violent crime
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ln(incarceration) )0.00 )0.03 )0.00 )0.04 0.19** 0.18* 0.19** 0.15
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
ln(abortion) 0.00 )0.00 0.00 )0.00 )0.01 )0.01 )0.01 )0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(males 15–34) )1.57 7.21*** )1.53 6.82*** 4.59** 7.01** 4.26** 5.27*
(1.44) (2.05) (1.48) (2.20) (1.91) (2.62) (2.03) (3.00)
ln(unemp. rate) 0.00 )0.03 )0.03 )0.10
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
ln(immigration) )0.01 0.04 )0.02 )0.01
(0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17)
Sample Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe
Observations 174 138 174 138 123 95 123 95
Countries 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5
Notes: All specifications include country fixed effects, year fixed effects and a quartic country specific time
trend. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
Table 4a. IV estimates, total crime
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ln(incarceration) )0.37*** )0.44*** )0.36** )0.34 )0.32* )0.40** )0.43* )0.43**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.48) (0.18) (0.19) (0.25) (0.20)
ln(abortion) 0.00 )0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(males 15–34) 1.78*** 1.83** 1.29 )1.35 4.26*** 4.60*** 5.06** 4.66***
(0.67) (0.84) (0.80) (5.85) (1.29) (1.51) (2.06) (1.60)
ln(unemp. rate) 0.33* 1.92 )0.18 )0.08
(0.19) (3.11) (0.27) (0.21)
ln(immigration) )0.27 )0.32 )0.56 )0.36
(0.25) (0.27) (0.58) (0.31)
Weak instruments:
First-stage F 17.88 15.87
Cragg–Donald 3.98 0.36 1.78 1.77 0.32 0.99
Stock–Yogo
critical value
(10% max IV size)
7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 >7.03 >7.03
Sample Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe
Observations 239 203 236 202 188 161 188 161
Countries 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7
Notes: All specifications include country fixed effects, year fixed effects and a quartic country specific time
trend. Standard errors in parentheses. The endogenous variables instrumented are prison population, unem-
ployment, and migration. The IVs are amnesties, IV-war, and the interaction between the price of oil and
industry share.
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
Table 4b. IV estimates, property crimes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ln(incarceration) )0.28** )0.38*** )0.23 )0.55 )0.76 )1.61 )1.33 )1.68
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (2.18) (1.00) (2.76) (2.47) (2.86)
ln(abortion) 0.00 )0.00 0.00 )0.03 0.00 )0.03 )0.00 )0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.16) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
ln(males 15–34) 0.02 1.34 0.88 )60.33 7.60 7.06 8.74 4.16
(0.91) (1.41) (1.64) (329.58) (10.68) (21.74) (20.01) (30.85)
ln(unemp. rate) 0.15 )5.95 )0.45 )0.20
(0.28) (32.13) (1.28) (1.20)
ln(immigration) )2.86 )5.97 )5.41 )6.31
(3.17) (9.30) (10.30) (10.00)
Weak instruments:
First-stage F 25.81 19.42
Cragg–Donald 0.85 0.03 0.07 0.30 0.05 0.05
Stock–Yogo
critical value
(10% max IV size)
7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 >7.03 >7.03
Sample Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe
Observations 207 171 200 166 152 125 152 125
Countries 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6
Notes: All specifications include country fixed effects, year fixed effects and a quartic country specific time
trend. Standard errors in parentheses. The endogenous variables instrumented are prison population, unem-
ployment, and migration. The IVs are amnesties, IV-war, and the interaction between the price of oil and
industry share.
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
4.2. IV estimates
Tables 4a–4c report IV (2SLS) estimates, paralleling the OLS estimates reported in
Tables 3a–3c. Checking the strength of the instruments is crucial, because a weak
instrument may induce a bias similar to the OLS bias and reduce efficiency at the
same time. In the case of a single endogenous variable (i.e. columns 1 and 2), the
appropriate test is the standard first-stage F test on excluded instruments. The test
shows that amnesties, with an F well above 10, are a remarkably strong instrument.
First-stage estimates (not reported) indicate that the average effect of an amnesty in
our sample is to reduce the incarceration rate by about 13% in the year the
amnesty is passed. However, with n > 1 endogenous variables and n instruments
we have n first-stage regressions. In this case the rule of thumb formalized by Stai-
ger and Stock (1997) – that is, F >10 – can no longer be applied, and the appropri-
ate test is the one developed by Stock and Yogo (2002). This is a generalization of
the univariate F test on excluded instruments to the multivariate case, based on the
Cragg–Donald statistics. As a benchmark to interpret the magnitude of the
Cragg–Donald statistics, notice that this is approximately equal to the first-stage
F statistic on excluded instruments in the case of a single endogenous variable. The
Stock–Yogo test immediately reveals that the instrument for unemployment and
(even more) the instrument for immigration are very weak: we can never reject the
Table 4c. IV estimates, violent crimes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ln(incarceration) )0.48** )0.37** )0.58 )0.37** )0.37 )3.67 )1.55 )3.98
(0.21) (0.17) (0.36) (0.19) (0.60) (86.91) (5.08) (164.67)
ln(abortion) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 )0.01 )0.15 )0.04 )0.16
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (3.44) (0.10) (6.29)
ln(males 15–34) )1.03 7.55*** 3.42 8.81 9.56 11.40 16.17 12.55
(1.32) (1.73) (3.52) (10.76) (6.09) (90.75) (36.19) (383.33)
ln(unemp. rate) 0.77* 0.11 )0.62 0.05
(0.44) (0.82) (2.17) (12.09)
ln(immigration) )1.30 )9.13 )6.27 )9.85
(1.73) (222.41) (20.51) (404.22)
Weak instruments:
First-stage F 18.81 14.49
Cragg–Donald 1.29 2.51 0.27 0.05 0.00 0.00
Stock–Yogo
critical value
(10% max IV size)
7.03 7.03 7.03 7.03 >7.03 >7.03
Sample Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe Full Europe
Observations 174 138 170 136 122 95 122 95
Countries 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5
Notes: All specifications include country fixed effects, year fixed effects and a quartic country specific time
trend. Standard errors in parentheses. The endogenous variables instrumented are prison population, unem-
ployment, and migration. The IVs are amnesties, IV-war, and the interaction between the price of oil and
industry share.
Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
null hypothesis of weak instruments when including either of these two variables.
The coefficients (and all coefficients) from specifications including these two vari-
ables are therefore unreliable as estimates of causal effects: even if the exclusion
restrictions hold the point estimates are not credible because the model is very
weakly identified. This also leads to very imprecise point estimates. An additional
reason for this imprecision is that data on immigration are available only from
1980 onwards: when using them, we lose about 30% of the observations. Similar
specifications (not reported) with a single endogenous regressor (either immigration
or unemployment) confirm the weakness of these two instruments: the first-stage
F statistic in this case is equal to 1.5 (immigration) and 5 (unemployment). The only
specification that provides credible causal effects is, therefore, the one in columns
1–2 of Tables 4a–4c, where in addition to identifying the elasticity of crime to
incarceration we identify the causal effect of abortion and age structure. This is our
preferred specification both because it avoids weak instruments issues and because
it considers the three factors (incarceration, abortion and age structure) that accord-
ing to Levitt (2004) and Imrohoroglu et al. (2004) are among the main factors
behind the drop in crime rates in the United States in the 1990s.
We deliberately choose to include in the regression only plausibly exogenous
variables (or instrumented endogenous variables). For example, despite the fact the
real GDP per-capita is strongly correlated to all economic fundamentals that,
according to the standard economic model of crime, potentially affect crime (e.g.
poverty, business cycle, property rights, human development, and even happiness),
this is not included in our regressions because it is potentially endogenous to crime
rates. It is worth noting, however, that our results are essentially unchanged when
we include GDP as a control. This is illustrated in the Web Appendix.
In the remainder of this section we discuss the estimates from our preferred spec-
ification in more detail.
4.2.1. Incarceration. As mentioned above, first-stage estimates (not reported) indi-
cate that the effect of amnesties on the prison population is large and significant.
Passing one amnesty in one year leads to a reduction in the prison population
rate of about 13% in our preferred specification. Comparing the estimates on incar-
ceration in Tables 3 and 4, most of the OLS coefficients are generally lower than
the corresponding IV, suggesting that OLS underestimate the effect of the prison
population on crime, as expected. The exception is the elasticity of property crime
to incarceration, which turns out to be upward biased when using OLS. Table-
s 4a–4c show that the elasticity of total crime per capita to the incarceration rate,
using IV in our preferred specification, is )0.37 for the full sample and )0.44 for
Europe only. A similar pattern is found for property crime ()0.28 for the full sample
and )0.38 for Europe only) and for violent crime ()0.48 for the full sample and
)0.37 for Europe only). As discussed above, superimposing a quartic country-specific
trend is a conservative approach: in fact, had we not employed such trends the coef-
ficients on incarceration rates would have been larger, except for violent crimes (see
Web Appendix). Furthermore, our estimate of the effect of incarceration is robust to
excluding abortion and demographics from the regression (results not reported). This
robustness confirms the presumption that amnesties do provide a source of exoge-
nous variation for incarceration rates. Overall, our results on incarceration are in
line with previous estimates by Levitt (1996), who exploits overcrowding litigation
across US states as an instrument and finds an elasticity in the range )0.3 to )0.4.
We perform a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation to quantify the contribu-
tion of the prison population to the ‘reversal of misfortunes’. The calculation works
as follows. Start with the crime rates in Europe and in the United States in 1970,
and simulate the dynamics of crime using incarceration as the only explanatory var-
iable, with the elasticities reported in the first column of Table 4a, 4b, 4c. Then
compare the simulated difference between crime rates in 2008 and in 1970 with
the actual difference. The ratio of the two is the contribution of the different
dynamics of prison population to the reversal. This calculation reveals that incar-
ceration explains 17% of the reversal for total crime, 33% for property crimes
alone, and 11% for violent crimes alone.
4.2.2. Abortion rates. As Tables 3 and 4 show, we do not find evidence supporting
the hypothesis that abortion rates decrease crime rates as Donohue and Levitt
(2001) find for the United States. Most of the point estimates have a positive sign
(which is the ‘wrong sign’) and are not precisely estimated. It is likely that the quar-
tic time trend absorbs all the variation in abortion rates, a slow-moving variable like
the demographic structure of the population. In fact when we remove the time
trend or use a linear trend we obtain a negative and significant point estimate (see
Web Appendix). However, even in this case the effect of abortion on crime rates
disappears when we consider European countries only (not reported). A word of
caution, however, is in order when comparing our findings with those of Donohue
and Levitt. As mentioned above, their measure of abortion rates is computed as the
sum of the abortion rate of each age group weighted by the percentage of arrests
in a cohort over the total crime in the United States in a given year. This measure
captures what they call the effective abortion rate, that is, the measure that is rele-
vant to crime in a given year. For European countries, data on arrests for each
cohort are not readily available every year so that we can only use the unweight-
ed abortion rates in our analysis. It is interesting, though, that the significant point
estimate obtained when removing time trends or using linear trends is completely
driven by the United States. A possible explanation is that in Europe a strong
welfare state, easy access to good education and strong family ties work as risk-
reducing factors that weaken the link between unwanted childbearing and crime.
Overall, one of the key elements explaining the drop in crime rates in the United
States seems to be ineffective in Europe. This result certainly deserves further
research.
4.2.3. Age structure. The elasticity of crime to the weight of young males in the
population is about 1.5 (IV estimates, preferred specification) and it is slightly larger
for European countries. Keeping constant the population, an increase of 1% in the
share of males between 15 and 34 years of age leads to a 1.5% increase in the total
crime rate. This effect is imprecisely estimated when we use property crimes as a
dependent variable. As for violent crimes, we obtain a very large estimate for the
European group in isolation. While a large coefficient for violent crime is not sur-
prising, a point estimate of 7 seems quite large. The same back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation made for incarceration rates suggests that the different dynamics in the age
structure between European countries and the United States cannot explain the
reversal of misfortune, a fact that was already made clear by Figure 4.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have explored the evolution of crime rates in Europe and in the Uni-
ted States since 1970. We have documented a ‘reversal of misfortunes’ and have
attempted the identification of the causes of this reversal. We have estimated the
impact of demographic structure, incarceration and abortion on crime rates. Unfortu-
nately, due to weak instruments, we cannot provide reliable evidence on the causal
effects of migration and unemployment rates. The OLS estimates for these two vari-
ables suggest that migration and unemployment increase crime rates, but it is not pos-
sible to assess the OLS bias. We uncovered two significant causal channels, though:
both the demographic structure of the population and the incarceration rate have a
non-negligible influence on crime rates. Back-of-the-envelope calculations based on
our estimates indicates that the different dynamics of the prison populations in Eur-
ope and the United States explain 17% of the reversal of misfortunes for total crime,
33% for property crimes, and 11% for violent crimes. We do not find evidence that
abortion rates reduce crime rates in Europe as much as previously found for the Uni-
ted States. Understanding why is beyond the scope of this paper, but future research
should investigate this different response of crime rates to abortion in Europe.
On the methodological side, we are well aware of the limitations of our analysis.
We acknowledge them here to emphasize that we regard our empirical exercise as
a starting point for further research rather than a conclusive word on an admittedly
complicated question. First, as Durlauf et al. (2008, 2010) show, aggregate crime
regressions like those used in this paper are consistent with a benchmark micro-
structure only under strong assumptions about the distribution of unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity. This points to a second limitation, namely the use of a
reduced-form approach that mimics experimental variations via instrumental vari-
ables to uncover causal effects. There is much controversy about what policymakers
can learn from such exercises (see, for instance, the Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Spring 2010, symposium on ‘Con out of economics’). We regard such controversy
as a constructive step towards a better empirical economics. In the meanwhile we
warn readers that our results are to be taken with caution, because the reduced
form approach we adopt is not able to pin down the channel through which the
factors that we analyse influence crime rates. Furthermore, reduced-form parame-
ters are likely not policy-invariant. As a consequence, it is difficult to make reliable
out-of-sample predictions. Third, there is no consensus on the use of time trends in
policy evaluation exercises (see, for instance, the discussions in Wolfers, 2006, and
Durlauf et al., 2008). We have shown that a quartic trend is a reasonable choice for
the problem at hand. However, this remains a matter of judgment. Finally, we con-
sider a selected set of explanatory variables. While the five factors we consider are
those emphasized in the economics literature on crime, we have no framework dic-
tating that these and only these should be considered.
What are the policy implications of our analysis? The first main finding – that is,
the existence of a reversal – should make policymakers in Europe aware of the fact
that crime (and violent crime in particular) is a very relevant issue, more than we
are accustomed to thinking when making casual comparisons with the United
States. The fact that the homicide rate is much higher in the United States than
in Europe (as documented in the Web Appendix) seems to generate the wrong
perception that Europe is a safer place. But homicides are only a small fraction
(although very important for their consequences) of violent crimes. The second main
finding – an elasticity of crime to incarceration of )0.4 – implies that incarceration
works. Therefore, a tougher incarceration policy may be an effective way of reduc-
ing crime in Europe. While this causal effect is informative, it raises two issues. First,
without knowing why incarceration works, it is hard to decide in what sense incar-
ceration policy should be tougher. If it works because of incapacitation, then con-
victing more criminals to longer sentences is the sense in which the policy should be
tougher. But if incarceration works because of deterrence, then inflicting long sen-
tences and placing criminals on parole, for instance, would be better policy. It is
impossible to resolve this first issue in a reduced-form framework like the one we
have employed: more research is needed on the channels that make incarceration
work. Second, our finding that incarceration is crime-effective does not imply that it
is a cost-effective policy. To conclude that more incarceration or longer sentences
are needed in Europe, we should understand how, at the current incarceration rates,
the marginal cost of a prison inmate to society compares to the marginal cost of
crime to victims in Europe. If the cost (to society) of incarcerating an additional
individual is below the cost (to victims) of additional crimes that this individual
would commit if left free, then more incarceration is efficient. For this type of cost-
benefit analysis, one needs two parameters: the elasticity of crime to incarceration
and the marginal costs of both crime and incarceration. In this paper we estimate
the first parameter. Calculating the marginal cost of crime and of incarceration is
hard because it involves things that are difficult to estimate. For instance, recent
research shows that incarceration may have a criminogenic effect on recidivism in
the long run (e.g. Chen and Shapiro, 2007; Bayer et al., 2009; Nagin et al., 2009;
Drago et al., 2011). Such dynamic, general equilibrium effects are not captured by
our estimates (which are based on a static panel data model) and may crucially alter
cost-benefit calculations. In particular, they may increase the marginal cost of incar-
ceration. Moreover, the ‘cost of an inmate to society’ includes not only the direct cost
of incarceration, but also the indirect costs in terms of additional general equilibrium
effects, from the distortionary effects of taxation needed to finance the judiciary and
prison systems to the effects on labour market equilibrium. This does not mean that
the cross-country evidence we have produced is of little use: while these two outstand-
ing issues prevent us from drawing strong policy conclusions, our estimates are quite
relevant for crime policy because they provide the basis to understand if more incar-
ceration in Europe would be efficient. But more research on this point is needed.
Discussion
Jerome Adda
University College London
This is a careful and interesting analysis that brings for the first time comparable
data across Europe and the US on various types of crime and its determinants.
The authors have made great effort to investigate the causal effect of many deter-
minants of crime. However, I even found the descriptive statistic of great interest.
The authors concentrate on five determinants of crime, which the previous
literature has identified as important. These include demographics, immigration,
unemployment, incarceration rates and abortion rates. The study leaves out other
determinants such as the role of education and the differential timing of drug waves
(such as crack-cocaine). The role of education in shaping crime has been investi-
gated by Lochner and Moretti (2004) among others. Presumably, the authors have
left out this variable for lack of reliable data across countries for the period of ana-
lysis. The authors control for GDP per capita as a measure of income. However,
what may be important are changes in the unskilled wage or minimum wage
(Machin and Meghir 2004). Another determinants of crime, or at least of its cycli-
cality, could be selective fertility induced by business cycles (as described by Dehejia
and Lleras-Muney 2004). As with selective abortion, it could change the composi-
tion of the young population. The strength of the paper is in its use of instrumental
variables to deal with the endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. The
validity of this procedure relies on the quality of these instruments. While I have lit-
tle problem with the supply-push factors to explain migration, other instruments
requires stronger assumptions. For instance, amnesties are used to instrument incar-
cerations. The authors do a great job to show that amnesties are not correlated
with past crime. However, is it politically feasible to pass an amnesty when current
crime is high or its growth rate is high? Moreover, during amnesty, the most dan-
gerous criminals are usually not pardoned. What this exercise estimates is the effect
of releasing low-level criminals, not a random selection of offenders. Finally, as
usual in this literature, the incarceration variable is measuring both a deterrence
effect and a lock-in effect. Distinguishing between both channels would be an inter-
esting exercise, although beyond the scope of this paper.
Bas Jacobs
Erasmus University Rotterdam
This is an interesting paper on a policy-relevant and under-researched topic. The
paper is well structured and the analysis is straightforward, transparent and clear.
The authors document that crime rates in Europe have become much higher than
in the US since 1990. In the US, crime rates substantially dropped during the last
20 years. The authors present a well-executed empirical analysis on the determi-
nants of crime in Europe so as to explain this divergent EU-US crime pattern.
Their main finding is that crime rates can be causally explained by incarceration
rates and the fraction of the male population aged 15-34. They find that the elasti-
city of crime with respect to incarceration rates for EU-countries is about the same
size as estimates obtained for the US. The authors use quite a convincing identifica-
tion strategy by resorting to prison amnesties to generate exogenous variation in
incarceration rates. Similarly, the authors assume quite reasonably that demo-
graphic variation is exogenous. Moreover, the authors demonstrate that unemploy-
ment (instrumented with oil-prices) and migration flows (instrumented with civil
and ethnic wars or ethnic violence) have little explanatory power to explain crime
rates. A number of comments can be made regarding the paper. Although appar-
ently often suggested in the crime literature, it is not so obvious that immigration
should have an impact on crime. One may suspect that there is a large amount of
heterogeneity in the immigrant population, ranging from asylum seekers, family
reunification, to labor migrants. Heterogeneity among immigrants is also caused by
country of origin, income levels and skill levels. Moreover, within the EU there is
free migration accounting for 27 percent of total immigration in the OECD and 44
percent of immigration in the EU-area (OECD, 2010). Probably, illegal immigrants
are overrepresented in crime statistics, but the latter group is not captured by the
official migration statistics, which are employed in the current paper. Similarly, it
would be surprising that labor immigration (including migration of spouses) – which
covers about 17 percent of total OECD-immigration – would be strongly associated
with crime, since migrants obtain a visa only conditional upon having work. Simi-
larly, family reunification – accounting for 18 percent of total OECD-immigration –
is possible only when certain age and income requirements are met. The figures
are drawn from OECD (2010). Hence, one should be careful in presuming that
immigration and crime are intimately linked. In addition, definitions of migration
stocks can vary across countries due to differences in the definition of who is
considered to be an immigrant. The paper and the web appendix do not provide
details on the way migration stocks are measured and whether the data are com-
parable across countries and over time. For all these reasons, a weak correlation
between crime and immigration might not be surprising in the first place. Using
weak instruments for migration tends to weaken this correlation even further. The
authors are aware of potential shortcomings of their empirical strategy. In particu-
lar, they are very clear about the strength of the instruments they employ to obtain
exogenous variation in the explanatory variables. I would have liked them having
tried improving this part of the paper and to obtain more reliable instruments for
the unemployment and migration variables. As regards unemployment, the authors
follow Blanchard and Katz (1992) by using oil-prices to generate exogenous varia-
tion in unemployment rates. The instrument does not seem to work very well, per-
haps because there is no cross-country variation in oil-prices and little time-
variation in sectoral structure across countries. As an alternative instrument, one
could possibly look at how changes in world trade affect employment in European
countries. Most EU-countries are small-open economies that have a limited (if not
negligible) impact on world-trade. If one believes that world-trade is exogenous to
small-open economies, then this could be a reasonable variable to instrument
unemployment rates. Cross-country variation can be introduced by interacting
world-trade with the openness of a country. Similarly, numerous European coun-
tries have implemented structural labor market reforms in recent decades. Argu-
ably, these reforms were not implemented to reduce crime rates, but to reduce
structural unemployment. Therefore, dummy variables indicating whether there
have been structural reforms in labor markets could be suitable instruments for
unemployment as well. As regards immigration, the authors should be applauded
for compiling their own data set with variables based on civil war, ethnic war or
ethnic violence. Unfortunately, these instruments also appear weak in explaining
migration patterns, as also indicated by the authors. I wonder whether this is due
to the fact that migration flows predicted by these variables presumably mainly
reflect asylum seekers. Asylum seekers are not representative for migrant popula-
tions in many countries. Asylum migration accounts for only 5 percent of total
OECD-migration (OECD, 2010). Immigration flows are also determined by, for
example, free movement of individuals in the EU, labor migration, marriage and
family reunification. These immigration flows are not so much caused by war or
violence, but by, among others, colonial and guest-worker histories and the Schen-
gen Treaty. Hence, the instrument cannot capture a lot of the variation in migra-
tion flows. A suggestion is then to seek for instruments that relate to e.g.
colonization patterns decades or even hundreds of years ago to predict current
migration flows. Similarly, many countries have adopted guest-worker policies in
the 1950s and 1960s when large numbers of guest workers were recruited. Vari-
ables related to guest-worker migration decades ago could therefore be reasonable
instruments for current migration flows, since current crime rates are arguably not
caused by colonial and guest-worker histories. Finally, the introduction of the
Schengen Treaty could be exploited as a natural experiment to generate exogenous
variation in migration flows. The paper documents a very intriguing pattern in the
crime rates in Europe and the US; Europe has overtaken the US in crime since the
1990’s. The authors take a first step in explaining this pattern using a number of
explanatory variables suggested by the literature: demographics, incarceration rates,
abortion rates, migration rates and unemployment rates. However, only the demo-
graphic and incarceration variables appear to be causally explaining crime. For
future research, one should probably explore other variables to explain crime as
well, such as income (growth), drug-related activities, family and social problems,
psychological traits, etc. However, one should be careful not to replicate research
that is already done in, for example, criminology, psychology or sociology. As it
seems, the time-series pattern in crime in the US and Europe discussed in the cur-
rent paper appears to be well-known in criminology, see, for example, PEW Center
on the States (2008). Finally, the policy conclusion is reached that higher incarcera-
tion rates are beneficial in reducing crime. I would like to raise a word of caution
against policies explicitly aiming to raise the total incarceration rate. Police officers
often say that prison provides the best education for a career in crime. In the
short-run, higher incarceration rates could indeed reduce crime, either through
deterrence or through incapacitation. However, the long-run effect could be that
the stock of ‘criminal human capital’ grows and an ever increasing number of indi-
viduals need to be incapacitated to prevent them from committing new crimes.
The US seems to have had exactly this experience, as the current US-incarceration
rate is about five times bigger than 40 years ago, about 7.2 million individuals were
under some form of correctional supervision (probation, prison, jail, parole), and
more than half of released offenders went back to prison within three years (Bureau
of Justice Statistics, 2011).
Panel discussion
Volker Nocke wondered whether there was any change in the composition of the
prisoner cohort in countries over time. He speculated that in East European coun-
tries there is a high level of organized crime and many of these people facilitated
by European Union accession may now operate in other European countries. Dalia
Marin referred the authors to previous research which argued that an important
determinant of crime among young males was their marriage status. Findings in a
Quarterly Journal of Economics paper suggest that the introduction of the contraceptive
pill led to a decline in shotgun weddings which reduced the number of young men
with familial responsibilities and their need to commit crime in order to provide for
their family. Eric Hanushek noted that in the United States the average level of
educational attainment has remained more or less constant while it has increased
across European countries. This would appear to contradict the claim that higher
levels of education reduce the crime rate.
Many of the panellists focused on specific aspects of the empirical strategy pur-
sued by the authors in the paper. Marco Pagano believed that the oil shocks vari-
able was not a good instrument for unemployment as it was likely to explain only a
small percentage of its variation and urged them to search for alternative instru-
ments. Michael Kiley advised the authors to continue with their instrumenting
strategy. Even though their instruments are found to be weak they may still
uncover robust findings. Andrea Ichino believed their approach is useful for under-
standing the differences in the crime rates between the United States and Europe;
however analysis of individual country amnesty events could provide specific
insights into the effect of incarceration on crime which would better inform policy.
Some of the panellists believed that many of the country-level determinants of
crime such as abortion rates to be relatively stable over the time period analysed.
The inclusion of fixed effects eliminated much of the variation in these variables
and therefore the likelihood of identifying their effect on crime. Fabrizio Perri
believed unemployment and immigration are more important determinants of
crime than the analysis suggests. He suggested the authors should estimate country-
specific regressions and also estimate their pooled regressions without time trends to
see if the effects of unemployment and immigration become more meaningful. Re-
fet Gu¨rkaynak focused on the role of the large downward trend in the US crime
rate in the data. He suggested that a US specific regression was likely to yield insig-
nificant results. He wondered how much of the current variation in the main model
was explained by the inclusion of the United States.
Richard Portes wondered if there is any research on the link between the age at
which alcohol can be legally consumed and violent crime. He also made the point
that the large proposed budget cuts in the United Kingdom include a substantial
cut to the prison budget and is likely to lead to a reduction in the incarceration
rates which would provide an interesting experiment on the link with crime rates.
Given there are higher crimes rates in cities, Daniele Terlizzese wondered if the
authors had considered the structure of cities as an explanation for the larger crime
rate in Europe compared to the United States.
In response to comments by Fabrizio Perri and other panellists, Giulio Zanella
remarked that they adopted a conservative approach to ensure the robustness of the
identified effect of incarceration on crime. In model estimations without quadratic
time trends they find that a number of the demographic variables become significant,
the effect of abortion on crime remains insignificant while the incarceration coeffi-
cient is higher. In reply to Eric Hanushek’s comment, Giulio Zanella agreed it was
important to control for education attainment; however, the variable is likely to be
endogenous with crime rates and they would need to find another instrument.
Web appendix
Available at http://www.economic-policy.org.
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